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Introduction 
Apart from limited constitutional protection for political speech, Australians 
do not have a legal right to free expression. Despite that, the importance of 
the right of freedom of speech is accepted by Australian society. However, 
some of the debate on racial vilification particularly in the media, has relied 
on popular misconceptions of the freedom of expression. This "rhetoric of free 
speech" has been used to justify rejecting racial hate legislation.1 
This paper assumes that the right of freedom of speech should be examined 
in two steps. It firstly acknowledges a prima facie unlimited right. Unless 
there is reason to the contrary, people should be able to say what they wish. 
However, the second step demands that the absolute freedom of speech may 
have to be qualified by competing rights or other issues. This paper focuses on 
the second step and argues that these limitations of free speech must be 
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This paper explores the tension between racial 
vilification legislation and the freedom of speech. 
It calls for a closer examination of the right to free 
expression to see if the arguments used to reject 
racial vilification legislation can be justified. The 
paper analyses the theories upon which the 
freedom of speech is based, assesses whether such 
legislation actually restricts the right and finally 
explores the "competition" between the right to 
freedom of speech and the right to freedom from 
racial vilification. It also considers the implications 
of Australia's constitutionally implied freedom of 
political speech. The paper concludes that racial 
vilification is a justifiable limit on the right to 
freedom of speech.
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considered as part of the racial vilification debate. This paper does this in 
three parts. 
Part 1 sets the scene by briefly outlining the racial vilification legislation in 
Australia. It deals with legislation of the Commonwealth, New South Wales, 
the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, South Australia and Western 
Australia. 
Part 2 examines the "rhetoric of free speech". It does this in three ways. 
Firstly, it challenges some of the theories upon which the freedom of speech 
is based. Secondly, it argues that in practice, racial vilification legislation does 
not unduly limit free speech. Finally, it also looks at how the right of freedom 
of speech is always subject to qualification by other competing rights. 
Part 3 of the paper deals with 
Australia's relatively new 
constitutionally implied freedom of 
political speech. It investigates what 
impact this guarantee will have on racial 
vilification legislation. 
This paper acknowledges that freedom 
of speech is an important part of 
Australian society and democracy. 
However, what is important is the reality 
of that right and not the rhetoric that 
often accompanies it. This paper argues 
that closer analysis of this rhetoric shows that the freedom of speech does not 
support rejecting racial vilification legislation. 
Part 1: Current Legislation2
 
The Commonwealth 
The Racial Hatred Act 1995 (Cth) amended the Racial Discrimination Act 
1975 (Cth) to prohibit racial vilification.3 The Commonwealth Government 
struggled to pass this legislation as it was opposed primarily on the ground that 
it would restrict the freedom of speech.4 The result was that the Act did not 
include criminal sanctions and created only discrimination law remedies.  
Subsection 18C(1) of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) prohibits any 
racially motivated act, done otherwise than in private, that is " reasonably 
likely" to offend,insult, humiliate or intimidate. Subsection 18C(2) provides 
that any act will not be done in private if it is done in a public place, within 
the sight or hearing of people in a public place or causes communication to the 
public. 5Section 18B facilitates proof of racial vilification by providing that the 
motivation for " doing an act" does not have to be a dominant or even 
substantial reason so long as it is areason.  
Section 18D contains very broad exemptions for acts said or done reasonably 
3
4
5 "The importance of 
the right of freedom 
of speech has led to 
it being advocated 
as the major reason 
not to enact racial 
vilification 
legislation." 
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and in good faith: 
z for artistic purposes;  
z in the course of a debate or discussion for academic, artistic or scientific 
purposes or for any other genuine purpose in the public interest;  
z to fairly and accurately report matters of public interest; or  
z to make fair comment if the comment is genuinely believed.  
These exemptions have been criticised as being too wide and also as being 
too focused on " neighbourhood racism" rather than public vilification.6  
Section 18E imposes vicarious liability on employers who fail to take 
reasonable steps to prevent racial vilification while section 18F preserves 
the operation of State and Territory laws. Any complaints of racial vilification 
can be made to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission.7 
New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory 
The Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW)8 and the Discrimination Act 1991 
(ACT) contain virtually identical racial vilification provisions.9 These Acts 
create both civil and criminal sanctions. Subsection 20C(1) of the Anti- 
Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW)10 makes it unlawful for a person, by a public 
act, to "incite hatred towards, serious contempt for or severe ridicule of" 
another because of their race. Subsection 20C(2)11 creates exemptions similar 
to those in the Racial Hatred Act 1995 (Cth).  
Section 20D12 creates criminal sanctions for more "serious racial 
vilification".13 Threatening physical harm towards property or persons or 
inciting others to make such threats are examples of more serious vilification.  
Both sections 20C and 20D require that the vilification be done by a public 
act. Section 20B14 defines "public act" broadly including communications to 
the public, any conduct observable by the public or any dissemination of any 
matter to the public knowing that matter expresses racial vilification. 
Queensland 
Racial vilification is not specifically unlawful under Queensland law. All 
that section 126 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) does is create a 
limited prohibition on inciting unlawful discrimination or another contravention 
of the Act through advocating racial or religious hatred. Although section 126 
focuses on preventing the Act being breached rather than stopping vilification, 
extreme cases of racial hatred may still fall within the section.  
The major problem with section 126 is that its drafting makes it " 
effectively useless" because it imposes an incredibly high onus of proof.15 
The complainant must prove not only that racial hatred was advocated but also 
that the hatred had a causal effect in inciting others to commit hate-inspired 
offences. 16 Because of this extraordinary onus of proof, there has never been 
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a successful section 126 complaint since the section was introducedin 1992.17 
This has meant that the Anti-Discrimination Commission has been unable to 
pursue any vilification claims. 18 The Queensland Government has recently 
been called upon to strengthen its stance against racial vilification by 
improving the Act but as of yet, it has not taken any steps to do so. 19  
South Australia 
The most recent Australian hate speech legislation is the Racial Vilification 
Act 1996 (SA). It creates both criminal and civil sanctions. Section 4 creates 
the criminal offenceof racial vilification which is very similar to section 20D of 
the Anti- Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW). Under section 5, prosecution of this 
offencerequires the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.  
Section 6 is unique in Australia in that it makes specific provision foran 
award of damages up to $40 000 in favourof any person vilified or in the 
case of a vilified group, an organisation formed to further the interests of that 
group.  
Section 7 of the Racial Vilification Act 1996 (SA) also creates civil remedies 
by inserting section 37 into the Wrongs Act 1936 (SA). These remedies are 
also unique in that they are available in tort law and not under discrimination 
law.20  
The actionable tort is an " act of racial victimisation that results in 
detriment". An " act of racial victimisation" is defined in subsection 37(1) in 
similar terms to the civil sanction created by section 20C of the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW). However, excluded from the definition of the 
tort is: 21 
z publication of a fair report of another person's act;  
z publication of material where that publication would be absolutely 
privileged in a defamation action; or  
z a reasonable act, done in good faith, for academic, artistic, scientific or 
research purposes, or for other purposes in the public interest.  
Subsection 37(1) also defines " detriment" which means " injury, damage or 
loss" or " distress in the nature of intimidation, harassment or humiliation". 
As with the criminal sanctions, damages are available to the victims of racial 
victimisation up to a limit of $40 000.22 To prevent " double dipping", both 
subsection 37(5) of the Wrongs Act 1936 (SA) and subsection 6(4) of the Racial 
Vilification Act 1996 (SA) require that any award of damages made must take 
into account any damages previously awarded.  
Western Australia 
Western Australia's response to the racial vilification problem has been to 
enact only criminal sanctions. The most serious offences are contained in 
sections 77 and 78 of the Criminal Code 1913 (WA). Section 77 makes it an 
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offence to possess threatening or abusive material intended to be published or 
displayed. The person must also intend to create or promote racial hatred by 
publishing that material. Section 78 creates an offence for the actual 
publication or display of that material with the same intention. 
Sections 79 and 80 create less serious offences for possession and display of 
such material respectively. They apply when the person intends only to 
harass a racial group. Under section 76, the definitions of terms such as 
"display" and "publish" make it clear that all of the vilification offences must be 
to the public or to a section of the public. 
Part 2: Analysis of Freedom of Speech 
Introduction: Importance of Free Speech in Australia 
Apart from the implied constitutional guarantee of free political speech,23 
Australians do not have a right to freedom of speech. Australians only have 
a right to say whatever the law's civil and criminal restrictions do not prohibit 
them from saying. 24 However, the notion of the right to freedom of speech is 
still an important part of Australia's legal psyche.  
Australia's democracy is politically underpinned by liberalism whose 
ideology strongly supports the freedom of speech. Its focus on the rights of 
individuals and their autonomy supports the idea that people should basically 
be free to say what they like. Any prohibition on speech can only be justified if 
that speech causes harm to another. However, as words do not usually cause 
harm, the State is prevented from intervening in these circumstances. Because 
of this and also the influence of the powerful freespeech lobby of the United 
States, 25 the freedom of expression is considered by Australian society to be 
an important right.  
The importance of the right of freedom of speech has led to it being 
advocated as the major reason not to enact racial vilification legislation. 
Unfortunately, this argument has often been misused with the focus being on 
an absolute right of free speech. To determine the role and importance of free 
speech in the racial vilification debate, a closer analysis of its limitations is 
necessary. After this analysis, it becomes apparent that the rhetoric of free 
speech does not justify rejecting racial vilification legislation.  
Theories Upon Which Freedom of Speech is Based 
The "Marketplace of Ideas" Theories 
One of the strongest arguments in favourof the right to freedom of speech 
is the " marketplace of ideas" theory.26 It claims that it is not necessary to 
curtail free speech because the marketplace will reject racial hatred. This 
liberalism oriented theory likens the flow of society's discourse to a 
marketplace where all ideas are able to compete against each other to 
determine the truth. Like goods for sale, the ideas that best represent the 
24
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truth will be selected while ideas that are false will be rejected. Liberals argue 
that the obvious falsity of racial hatred means that society will reject it, 
making such speech offensive but basically harmless.  
There are other theories that express similar themes in support of the 
freedom of speech. One of these theories is based on the use of " counter 
speech". This is speech that advocates racial tolerance which aims to persuade 
racists that they are wrong or at least to publicly expose their prejudices as 
being flawed.27  
Another related argument is the " fresh air" theory. Liberals argue that it is 
better that these racist views are expressed openly in the " fresh air" rather 
than behind closed doors. This way they can be adequately countered and 
exposed for what they are.28 The racial groups would also have an advantage 
in that they knew they were hated.29  
A final linked theory is based on the possibility of a " fightback" mentality. 
This is where people, inspired by disgust, actively oppose any racist views. 
30 This is supported by the partial public outcry over Pauline Hanson's racism as 
well as the Unity Against Racism Rally that was held on 2 November 1996. All of 
these theories supporting the freedom of speech are premised on the fact that 
society will evaluate ideas and reject those without merit. 31 While this is 
possible, it is unlikely as the popularity of Pauline Hanson illustrates. 32 Like an 
economic marketplace, an accurate selection of true ideas over false one will 
only occur in a perfect system. A perfect system requires people to critically 
evaluate their choices and have enough information to do this. Because of the 
imperfections of the marketplace of ideas, people do not make informed 
choices on the basis of truth.  
A major reason for the distortion of the ideas market is access to media.33 
The victims of racial vilification are usually minorities often disempowered 
by the vilification itself or their financial circumstances. This precludes 
effective access to public opinion so the messages that society receives on how 
to " buy" its ideas are distorted. For example, a mining company generally has 
farmore power and greater access to resources than a regional Aboriginal group 
would. 34  
The marketplace theories have also been criticised on the basis that most, 
if not all racist views, do not aid the quest for truth. 35 Instead, racial 
vilification through prejudice, ignorance or blatantly false information obscures 
the truth. For example, Holocaust denial is clearly historically wrong and could 
not contribute to the search for truth. 36 Limiting speech to that which only 
helps the quest for truth has already been legally recognised in other contexts 
such as in court. For example, hearsay or other prejudicial evidence that does 
not help the search for truth, or may obscure the truth, is not admissible.37  
Because the search for truth is flawed, society will select the remaining 
dominant ideas at the marketplace regardless of their merits. If racial 
vilification is allowed to legally continue, it will assume more dominance until 
the marketplace may determine it to be the truth.  
29
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The " fresh air" or counter speech aspects of the marketplace theories 
can also be criticised as they fail to deal with the more " mundane" 
racism. Racial vilification usually happens to ordinary people as part of their 
daily life. Because this racism has such a low profile, it is unlikely to be 
brought to public attention. This means that there is little value in bringing the 
racism " out into the open" because it is not publicly exposed as being wrong 
nor is it the subject of counter speech.38 
The Harm Principle 
Another argument commonly used by liberalism to support the freedom of 
speech is that racial vilification does not cause any harm. Liberalism is 
premised on individual autonomy permitting the State to intervene only when 
one individual's acts cause harm to another. As racial vilification is only words, 
it cannot cause harm to another so any restriction on the freedom of speech 
cannot be justified. 39 Liberals would demand proof of a link between racial 
vilification and physical violence or deprivation of rights beforeany harm was 
recognised.  
Liberalism's premise that racial vilification does not cause harm is flawed. 
Liberals tend to fit rights and freedoms into accepted, pre-existing 
categories so they are reluctant to introduce legislation aimed at combating a 
harm not already recognised such as racial vilification.40  
The liberalism harm principle also insists on applying a " clear and present 
danger" test. This requires a fear of physical harm when the vilification 
occurs beforethe State can intervene. Because racial vilification is a lot more 
subtle and relies on fear and ignorance over a period of time, this test is 
inappropriate. 41 Further, racial vilification is categorised as " offensive" which 
wrongly places the harm within the victim's control as if they could have 
chosen to avoid it. 42 This victim blaming obscures and trivialises the harm they 
suffer. A final criticism is that the cost of the arbitrary line of protection drawn 
by the harm principle is usually borne by those who are least able to bear it: in 
this case, racial minorities.43  
Although liberals contend that words are only words, racial vilification is a 
serious attack on the psychological and emotional health of the victim. 44 
This harm that vilification causes has been recognised on an international 
level. 45 Group identification is an important part of any person. This is even 
more so in the case of minorities as their colour, religion or race becomes a 
strong distinguishing feature from those around them. 46 Because of this, 
attacking a person on the basis of their race strikes at the very core of their 
identity. This undermines liberalism's obsession with individualism and exposes 
the real harm of racial attacks.  
Continual abuse also undermines a victim's sense of subjective integrity and 
intrudes into their psyche. The result is that victims of racial vilification 
may define themselves in relation to the abuse and be unable to separate 
themselves from it effectively.47 In addition, words cause harm because they 
have a context. In light of previous atrocities, violence and oppression, words 
35
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can be incredibly powerful. Phrases like " Necklace a Nigger" mean so much 
more than what the words by themselves say. 48  
Further, the failure to recognise the harm caused by racial vilification is 
inconsistent with other laws in our liberal society. Defamation, obscenity, 
bribery, blackmail and sexual harassment are all examples of " just words" that 
society thought caused sufficient harm to justify government intervention.49  
Narratives are also an important part of the debate about the harm of 
racial vilification. They are used to show the victim's real pain. This 
method, commonly utilised by critical race theorists, uses the victim's story to 
make legal argument. It is a very practical legal approach that focuses not on 
theory or principles but instead on experiences. 50 This tool has been very 
influential in illustrating the real harm that the victims of racial vilification 
suffer.  
The nature of racial vilification also prevents victims from participating 
fully in life, society and democracy.51 Because hate speech can be so 
intimidating, victims may be threatened into silence.52 It is ironic that one of 
the rights that racial vilification threatens is the freedom of speech itself.53 
This situation is worsened because society may not even listen to the victims 
because the hate speech has conditioned people to perceive them as lazy or 
stupid. 54  
The victims of vilification may also be forced to move house or not go to 
certain places because of the harassment they receive. 55 They may even 
limit their involvement in Australia's political process. 56  
Liberals often undermine the harm of racial vilification by trivialising the 
size of the problem. 57 They may do this by claiming that any racism is 
unorganised, spontaneous and isolated. 58 This stance is hard to justify in light 
of the recent government inquiries into racism and racial violence. For 
example, the National Inquiry into Racist Violence in Australia, the Royal 
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody and the Australian Law Reform 
Commission Reference on Multiculturalism and the Law all noted concerning 
levels of racism. While it was conceded that racism was not endemic as it was 
in countries like the United States, it was still significant. The victims of racial 
vilification may also suffer harm because of the link between hate speech and 
racial violence. 59 Gordon Allport's work shows a continuum on which racial 
vilification can often progress to violence as occurred in Nazi Germany. 60 
Some writers believe that the United States' obsession with ensuring the 
freedom of speech has allowed a pattern of racial violence to entrench itself.61  
The implied acceptance of racial vilification shown by government 
inactivity worsens the harm for the victims. 62 Although victims can dismiss 
hate groups as unbalanced extremists, it is much more difficult to dismiss the 
government, which is the official body that represents the society in which we 
live.  
41
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A final danger of the focus on the rhetoric of the freedom of speech is that 
it shifts attention away from the victim's hurt. 63  
Racial vilification does cause the substantial harm that liberals require for 
the State to intervene. Although hate speech is just words, liberals fail to 
consider that these words can scar their victims, limit their participation in life 
and help escalate racial violence. This substantial harm justifies racial 
vilification legislation.  
Democracy 
The right to freedom of speech is often justified as a prerequisite for 
democracy. People must be able to participate and have input into their 
political process. 64 This is necessary forit to be a government of the people. 
Democracy also requires that citizens be freeto receive all the information 
they need to make collective decisions such as voting. 65 To restrict the 
freedom of speech would be contrary to these two principles and challenge the 
dignity of democracy.  
This argument can be countered by the fact that the promotion of racial 
hatred is destructive and so does not protect democracy.66 Racial 
vilification is based on ignorance and prejudice and does not contribute to any 
rational debate. Although many liberals accept that, they maintain that 
content is not important because to place restrictions on content could be the 
thin edge of the wedge.67 The fearis that without the freedom of speech, 
democracy could be jeopardised by moral majoritarism. However, this concern 
is overstated as argued in paragraphs 53 to 55. The democracy justification for 
free speech could be further criticised as it would equally be valid forsociety to 
democratically choose to place restrictions on the freedom of speech.68  
Liberals have also justified the freedom of speech by claiming that the 
State poses a threat to the autonomy of the people. 69 They believe that 
the State should only be able to intervene where some harm is being caused to 
another. In the 18th century when liberalism was conceived, gaining political 
freedoms and protection from State intervention was very relevant.  
However, these arguments are less convincing in today's Australian society. 
In Australia today, the State poses less of a threat to the rights of the 
individual. In fact, the role of government today is often geared towards 
protecting individuals especially society's weaker groups. 70 Because today's 
Australian society differs from the 18th century, this liberal argument is less 
persuasive.  
Fear of Censorship 
A strong argument advanced by liberals in favourof the freedom of speech 
is that censorship of hate speech is dangerous. It is the thin edge of the 
wedge that will enable further censorship of less offensive material. 71 The 
fear is that racial vilification legislation may become the first step towards an " 
autocracy of cultural correctness" where any unpopular thoughts are 
47
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outlawed.72 Although liberals concede that racial vilification is offensive, they 
say it is the price that society pays to protect the freedom of speech.73  
This fearof censorship is heightened with racial vilification because the line 
between criticism and abuse is not clear. To outlaw one would endanger 
the existence of the other.74 These fears are worsened by the alleged 
uncertainty of existing racial vilification legislation as uncertainty could make 
the line between abuse and criticism even harder to find.75  
Liberalism's fearof censorship is at least partially justified. However, the 
problem is overstated. Although censoring racial vilification would make 
other censoring easier, it is still a long way from an " autocracy of cultural 
correctness". Existing legislation outlawing defamation, obscenity, bribery, 
blackmail and sexual harassment has not led to the widespread censorship that 
liberals fear. Their stance can also be criticised because it calls upon racial 
minorities, one of society's vulnerable groups, to pay the price forthe freedom 
of speech on behalf of all of society. Liberals also raised fears about the hazy 
line between abuse and criticism. However, this haziness is rarely used to stop 
criticism and is more often misused to racially vilify. It is very easy to dress up 
racial abuse as " criticism" to gain legitimacy. The classic example is " criticism" 
that is not supported by data or any other evidence.  
Tolerance 
The freedom of speech is also supported by an argument advocating 
tolerance. All speech, including racial vilification, should be tolerated 
because it is a feature of a mature society to meet intolerance with tolerance 
and to endure the vilification.76 Showing tolerance is also teaching racists to 
be more tolerant of difference including difference in race.  
However, the tolerance argument is flawed. Firstly, there is no need to 
tolerate racial vilification as it is false. 77 Further, any tolerance is 
inherently limited. Through offencessuch as defamation or obscenity, our law 
already concedes that there is a limit to what must be endured.78 A final 
criticism of tolerance is that it requires racial minorities, one of society's 
weakest groups, to bear the burden of adhering to this virtuous ideal. 
Speech as "Individual Self Realisation" 
A less conventional argument supporting the freedom of speech is 
advocated by Redish who believes that speech should be protected because 
speech in itself is good.79 The need for some greater good, which is the 
premise of the liberalism theories, is irrelevant. Redish believes that speech in 
itself is good because it is " individual selfrealisation".  
However, Redish's theory has been criticised. Firstly, it regards speech as 
different from any other activity as it presumes that speech is the only way 
of selfrealisation.80 On Redish's logic, forming contracts or assaulting another 
person is not selfrealisation. This distinction cannot be justified.  
54
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Redish's theory also concedes that speech must be restricted if it would 
cause a public riot or disturb the peace. This is inconsistent with speech in 
itself being good.81 Finally, his theory fails to consider that it becomes 
incredibly difficult to selfrealise if you are being abused. Therefore,his 
protection is inconsistent as it only applies to the speaker and not to the 
listener. 82 
Conclusion 
The freedom of speech is an important part of Australian society and 
democracy. The theories that underlie free speech support that role. 
However, while these theories have some validity, they also have some 
limitations. Consequently, the right of freespeech and its rhetoric must also be 
subject to qualification.  
Is Free Speech Really Being Restricted by Racial 
Vilification Legislation? 
Legislative Safeguards for Freedom of Speech 
Current Australian racial vilification 
legislation is very conscious of not 
unduly limiting the freedom of speech.83 
As a result, it is drafted to maximise 
continued public discussion. One way the 
legislation protects the freedom of speech 
is to have broad exemptions that legalise 
racial vilification in certain situations. In 
fact, the exemptions in section 18D of the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) have 
been criticised as being too wide.84 For 
example, most racial vilification legislation will allow reasonable discussion in 
good faith on any matter in the public interest regardless of whether it racially 
vilifies a group or not.85  
Further, the legislation generally only deals with the most severe types of 
racial vilification. This means that a lot of " low level racism" is not 
outlawed. 86 In addition, much of the legislation does not contain criminal 
sanctions which are more likely to restrict the freedom of speech.87 Even in 
those jurisdictions that do have criminal sanctions, they are rarely used and 
reliance is usually placed on civil conciliation-based remedies. Another 
protection forthe freedom of speech is that the legislation generally only deals 
with public acts. 88 This gives total protection forall speech made in private.  
Finally, the possible outcomes of breaching racial vilification legislation are 
not so severe as to unduly stifle the freedom of speech.89 Offenders may 
be asked to participate in investigating and conciliating the matter or they may 
eventually be required to appear before a quasi-judicial discrimination 
tribunal. Before the tribunal, they may be subject to awards of damages or 
60
61
62 "Because the right to 
free speech and the 
right to freedom 
from racial hostility 
compete, one must 
be qualified by the 
other." 
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other remedies such as public apologies. Although for some criminal offences, 
a short jail term may be imposed, those offences are only for very serious 
vilification. On the whole, racial vilification legislation is drafted to ensure the 
freedom of speech remains substantially intact. 
New South Wales Experience 
Over the past eight years, the New South Wales experience with racial 
vilification legislation has shown that it does not unduly limit the freedom 
of speech. In 1989, sections 20B to 20D of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 
(NSW) were enacted containing probably the broadest racial vilification 
legislation in Australia with both criminal and civil sanctions. 90  
While the Act would have limited freespeech to some extent, 91 Hennessy 
and Smith believe that that limit has not been significant. 92 There has 
been some criticism of the Act but a lot of it has stemmed from ignorance or 
selectively cited evidence.93 The New South Wales experience shows that in 
practice, racial vilification legislation does not significantly impair the freedom 
of speech.  
Promotion of Victim's Freedom of Speech 
In some ways, racial vilification legislation would improve the freedom of 
speech.94 The intimidating nature of hate speech means that often victims 
feel threatened into submission.95 This could limit their willingness or ability to 
speak out against this abuse or even to express themselves in other contexts. 
Racial vilification legislation would help protect victims and their rights of 
freespeech.96  
Improving Freedom of Speech Through Martyrs and by Giving Racists 
Forums 
Racial vilification legislation has been strongly criticised for creating 
martyrs and giving racists public forums. 97 The racists may use the 
publicity their prosecution brings to spout their racist views and proclaim 
themselves to be sacrificed as martyrs for the freedom of speech. Although this 
publicity has its dangers, it does indirectly enhance the freedom of speech by 
enabling racists to broadcast to a wider audience.  
Conclusion 
Racial vilification legislation does not unduly limit the freedom of speech 
especially as it usually contains broad exemptions. The New South Wales 
experience supports this. Further, by empowering minorities to participate 
fully in society and by public prosecutions, the legislation may have a limited 
effect in promoting free speech. The dangers that racial vilification legislation 
poses for the freedom of speech are overrated. 
Competing Rights as Qualifications on Freedom of 
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Speech 
Introduction 
The right to freespeech has never been an absolute right. It has always 
been subject to qualification by other competing rights. Laws about 
defamation, obscenity, bribery, blackmail and sexual harassment are all 
examples of this. This paper uses the word " competing" rather than " 
conflicting" because the competition between rights seeks to find a balance or 
equilibrium between the two rather than one dominating the other.  
In the case of racial vilification legislation, it is the right to be free from 
racial hostility or the right to equality that competes with the freedom of 
speech. There are two instruments that illustrate this tension between these 
competing rights that are appropriate to the Australian context: the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Canada's Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. 98 The United States' approach is not appropriate 
because of its constitutional obsession with freespeech.99  
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Through conventions, the international community has recognised the 
importance of racial vilification legislation. Article 4 of the International 
Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination condemns 
any propaganda or organisations that are based on racial supremacy or attempt 
to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination. Article 4 also requires 
that speech that is based on racial superiority or hatred or incites racial 
discrimination or racial violence be outlawed. 100 The result of this 
international focus on racial hatred has meant that almost every jurisdiction in 
the world has racial vilification laws. 101  
The focus of this section is on the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights . Subarticle 19(2) of that Covenant protects the right to 
freedom of expression. However, this is subject to " special duties and 
responsibilities" which may restrict that right. 102 These restrictions must be 
necessary to maintain people's rights of reputation or to protect national 
security, public order or the public health or morals. 103 This right to freedom 
of speech competes with subarticle 20(2) which prohibits any advocacy of 
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence. Article 5 is important as it prohibits one 
right from destroying or limiting another right except as provided for in the 
Covenant.  
Because the right to freespeech and the right to freedom from racial 
hostility compete, one must be qualified by the other. The United Nations 
Human Rights Commission has heard two cases on this issue. In both cases, the 
Commission decided that the right to freedom of speech should be qualified by 
the right to freedom from racial hostility. 104  
It decided that reasonableness was the test to establish whether the 
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freedom of speech had been unduly restricted. Reasonableness means that 
any interferencewith freespeech must be proportionate to the end sought and 
be necessary in the circumstances of the case.105 This is very similar to the 
approach taken by the High Court in dealing with the constitutionally implied 
freedom of political speech.106  
Because in each of the two cases heard, the racial vilification legislation 
was proportionate to the end sought, it was a reasonable restriction on the 
freedom of speech.107 This was so even when the racial vilification was of a 
political nature.108  
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects the freedom of 
speech.109 However, section 1 of the Charter also says that it only 
guarantees rights to " such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". It has been argued 
that equality and freedom from racism are crucial to a free and democratic 
society and could thereforejustify a reasonable qualification on freespeech.  
To resolve the competition between the right to equality or freedom from 
racism and the right to freedom of speech, the Canadian Supreme Court 
used a three part proportionality test. 110 This test aims to assess whether the 
limit on the freedom of speech is reasonable111 and is similar to the approach 
taken by the United Nations Human Rights Commission and the High Court of 
Australia.  
To assess whether racial vilification legislation is a reasonable limit on free 
speech, the Canadian Supreme Court will determine if:112 
If each part of the three part proportionality test is met, then the racial 
vilification legislation will be valid. 
R v Keegstra113 is an example of how the competition between the two 
rights can be resolved. By a four/three majority, the Supreme Court of 
Canada upheld the racial vilification provision as being constitutionally valid. In 
doing so, the majority of the court decided that equality and freedom from 
racism were concepts that were central to the notion of a free democracy. As 
the provision outlawing racial vilification was proportionate to protecting those 
rights, it was a reasonable limit on the freedom of speech.  
The minority dissented strongly and said that the provision was too broad 
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there is a rational connection between the legislation and its 
objective
the legislation impairs the Charter as little as possible
the effects of the legislation are not so severe as to represent an 
unacceptable abridgment of free speech.
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and uncertain. This led them to conclude that the racial vilification 
provision was not a proportionate means of achieving equality and freedom 
from racism. The split between the majority and the minority was caused by a 
different perception of the values underlying the freedom of speech.114 The 
minority favouredthe United States model that would make the freedom of 
speech a " pivotal Charter right" whereas the majority looked at the Charter's 
general concern forindividual dignity and equality. 115  
Conclusion 
The right to freedom of speech competes with the right to be free from 
racial hostility. This competition means that free speech is not an absolute 
right and will be subject to reasonable qualifications. The international and 
Canadian perspectives show that proportionate racial vilification legislation can 
be a reasonable limitation. This means that the use of the rhetoric of 
freespeech to reject racial vilification legislation is flawed.  
Analysis of Freedom of Speech: A Conclusion 
The right to freedom of speech has been used to justify rejecting racial 
vilification legislation. However, the merits of free expression arguments 
have often been distorted by focusing on the rhetoric of an absolute right, 
rather than a qualified right.  
This has happened in three ways. Firstly, the theories upon which freedom 
of speech is based have their limitations. Further, practical experience has 
shown that racial vilification legislation does not unduly limit the freedom of 
expression. Finally, freespeech is not absolute as it is subject to qualification 
by competing rights. These three arguments undermine the rhetoric of 
freespeech and justify racial vilification legislation as a legitimate qualification 
on the freedom of expression. 
Part 3: Australia's Implied Freedom of 
Political Speech 
Implied Freedom and Racial Vilification 
In 1992, the High Court foundimplied in the Australian Constitution116 a 
guarantee for the freedom of political speech.117 The recent cases of Levy 
v State of Victoria & Ors 118 and Lange v Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation119 have affirmed its existence.120  
This guarantee was distilled from the provisions and structure of the 
Constitution particularly the concept of representative government that is 
enshrined in the Act.121 This constitutional guarantee will prevail over all other 
Commonwealth and State legislation.122 If racial vilification legislation offends 
the implied guarantee by unduly restricting the freedom of political speech, 
then prima facie it will be invalid. However, this is subject to restrictions on 
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the guarantee as discussed in paragraphs 89 to 91.  
The four judges of the majority in Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times 
Ltd123 have broadly defined what will be protected by the guarantee as 
political speech. In particular, three of those judges, Mason CJ, Toohey and 
Gaudron JJ, have defined political speech as that which relates to " public 
affairs". 124 They also specifically said that debate on an Aboriginal political 
leader would fall within that definition. 125 This means that any racial 
vilification legislation that outlaws racial hate speech as it relates to "public 
affairs" will prima facie be invalidated by the guarantee. 126  
Racial Vilification Legislation as a Limit on Implied 
Freedom 
The implied guarantee of freepolitical speech is not absolute. 127 It may be 
limited by racial vilification legislation if it " is reasonable in the sense that 
it is reasonably appropriate or adapted to the preservation or maintenance of 
an ordered society under a system of representative democracy and 
government."128 This means that the public interest of our society, which is 
based on representative democracy, must favour racial vilification legislation 
over an unrestricted freedom of political speech.129 Relevant to determining 
that, is whether the legislation is proportionate to the legitimate end that it 
hopes to achieve. 130 In this case, the end to be achieved is the prevention of 
racial hostility.  
The qualifications on the freedom of speech explored in Part 2 are relevant 
here. They undermine an unlimited right of free speech and show that the 
public interest favours racial vilification legislation.131 This conclusion is 
supported by the joint judgment of Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ in 
Theophanous. 132 They held that the " public interest to be served [by implying 
a right to freedom of political speech] does not warrant protecting statements 
made irresponsibly."133 There is clearly nothing responsible about racism so the 
public interest supports enacting racial vilification legislation.134  
Such legislation must also not be disproportionate to preventing racial 
hostility. As Australia's legislation only deals with more serious vilification 
and does not impose excessive penalties, it would not be excessive. However, 
legislation would not be protected if it prohibited criticism rather than abuse 
as this is beyond what is reasonable or proportionate. Although those proposing 
racial vilification legislation must be aware of the implied guarantee of free 
political speech, all reasonable legislation will not be invalidated by it.  
Conclusion 
The rhetoric of free speech does not justify rejecting racial vilification 
legislation. By failing to recognise crucial qualifications of the right of 
freedom of expression, its importance has been overrated. After closer 
analysis, the rhetoric used in support of freespeech is exposed as being flawed 
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in three major ways.  
Firstly, the theories upon which the freedom of speech is based have their 
limitations. Their failings mean that the right they support must also be 
limited. Secondly, legislation such as the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) 
has shown that in reality speech has not been unduly limited. The scope of 
such legislation and its exemptions have helped protect freedomof expression.  
Finally, the rhetoric of free speech fails to consider that the freedom is not 
an absolute right. As the Canadian and international perspectives show, it 
is qualified by competing rights such as the right to be free from racial 
hostility. When these three limitations of free speech rhetoric are exposed, 
freedom of expression no longer justifies rejecting racial vilification 
legislation.  
In Australia, the implied constitutional guarantee of political free speech 
must also be considered. Provided any racial vilification legislation is 
reasonable in preventing racial hostility, the guarantee will not be offended. 
The freedom of speech is an important right in Australian society and 
democracy. However, the rhetoric that often accompanies it is flawed. Closer 
analysis of freespeech means that this rhetoric must be abandoned forreality. 
Once that is done, it becomes clear that racial vilification legislation is an 
important and legitimate limit on the freedom of speech.  
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